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Abstract: Accounts of deep disagreements can generally be categorized as 
optimistic or pessimistic. Pessimistic interpretations insist that the depth of 
deep disagreements precludes the possibility of rational resolution altogether, 
while optimistic variations maintain the contrary. Despite both approaches’ 
respective positions, they nevertheless often, either explicitly or implicitly, 
agree on the underlying assumption that argumentation offers the only possible 
rational resolution to deep disagreements. This paper challenges that idea by, 
first, diagnosing this argument-only model of arriving at rational resolutions, 
second, articulating a competing but undertheorized Hegelian-informed 
approach, and third, attending briefly to some of the challenges of such an 
approach. 
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I. An Optimistic Outlook 
Deep disagreements, or disagreements in which argumentation seems unable to 
bridge conflicting forms of reasoning, abound in religion, economics, politics, 
science, and of course philosophy. Despite the prevalence of easy examples, 
considerable contestation remains regarding what it means for a disagreement 
to be ‘deep’ and whether this sort of depth precludes the possibility of rational 
resolution. Accounts of deep disagreements generally fall within one of two 
camps: optimistic or pessimistic interpretations. On the pessimistic 
interpretation, deep disagreements by virtue of their depth cannot be rationally 
resolved (Davson-Galle 1992; Fogelin 1985 and 2007; Campolo 2005 and 2009). 
Optimistic variations – the focus of this paper – reject the idea of absolute depth 
in principle and instead maintain that deep disagreements can indeed be 
rationally resolved (Lugg 1986; Turner 2005; Turner and Wright 2005; Feldman 
2005 and 2007; Phillips 2008; Godden and Brenner 2010; Siegel 2013; Aikin 
forthcoming). 
The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is to diagnose and identify two 
subsidiary forms of optimistic accounts of deep disagreements. More specifically, 
I hope to offer an exploratory sketch of a competing but undertheorized 
alternative to what I call the argument-only approach to deep disagreements. I 
call this account the argument-plus approach. My second goal in this paper is to 
suggest a plausible way of defending the argument-plus model against the 
objections that derive from my Hegelian formulation of the approach – namely, 
its ostensibly naive valorization of second nature and habit and its paternalistic 
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nature. Although my defense of the argument-plus approach is largely centered 
on what I take to be the most crippling objections, I nevertheless offer some 
suggestions for potential responses to the other concerns regarding relativism 
and the deflation of the force of reasons for the interested argument-plus 
defender. 
My suggestion is that optimistic portrayals of deep disagreements tend to 
take one of two forms: the argument-only and the argument-plus model. 
Proponents of both approaches, insofar as they are optimistic programs, accept 
the idea that deep disagreements can be rationally resolved. The central 
distinguishing feature of these two interpretations hinges on whether 
argumentation constitutes the sole method of producing rational resolutions to 
deep disagreements. Whereas the argument-only approach is committed to the 
idea that argumentation comprises the only method of arriving at rational 
resolutions to deep disagreements, the argument-plus model rejects the idea 
that argumentation constitutes the only source of such rational resolutions. 
Within the existing deep disagreement literature, many explicitly accept the 
argument-only model or do so implicitly in their failure to consider non-
argumentative means of producing nevertheless rational resolutions to deep 
disagreements (Feldman 2005 and 2007; Phillips 2008; Godden and Brenner 
2010; Siegal 2013; Aikin forthcoming).  
Given the relative paucity of argument-plus defenders (Turner 2005; 
Turner and Wright 2005; Lugg 1986), it is no surprise that the position remains 
severely undertheorized. In what follows, I first offer an elaboration of the 
central commitments that I take to underwrite the argument-only approach and 
the strengths that accordingly follow. Once we have a working conception of the 
argument-only approach in place, we will be in a better position to recognize 
both the motivations for adopting an argument-plus approach and the 
difficulties such a position faces.  
II. The Argument-Only Approach 
Rather than offer a careful articulation of the diverse assortment of argument-
only approaches, my intention in this paper is merely to provide us with a rough 
approximation of such an account. I want to suggest that there are at least five 
reasons to adopt the argument-only approach to deep disagreements. First, the 
argument-only approach rests on a Kantian conception of rationality, insofar as 
it takes reflection – in the form of giving, asking, and assessing reasons – to 
constitute the most developed manifestation of rationality. For Kant, the ideal 
form of deliberation for finite rational beings is critical reflection, wherein the 
agent abstracts from her reasons for action, explicitly evaluates her motives and 
reasons, and legislates moral law for herself, thereby realizing her rational 
nature (Walsh 2012, 286). The reason reflection holds this revered place for 
Kant and, as I argue, for argument-plus defenders is that rationality most fully 
manifests in the activity of critical reflection, which takes on its public form in 
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argumentation in which reasons are made explicit and correspondingly 
evaluated. At the core of most argument-only approaches, there seems to exist a 
general tendency to valorize critical reflection in this Kantian manner. This 
underlying commitment explains why argument-only defenders insist that 
argumentation constitutes the sole means of reaching rational resolutions to 
deep disagreements.  
In holding argumentation in such high regard, the argument-only model 
effectively relegates other forms of persuasion, such as education, manipulation, 
and brainwashing, as not yet rational or patently irrational. Less controversial 
forms of persuasion, such as education, are not yet rational in the sense that they 
do not manifest into argumentative – that is, their fully realized and rational – 
form, though they may enable us to realize our rational potential and can 
consequently be characterized as implicitly or latently rational. Accordingly, for 
the proponent of the argument-only approach, the only possible source of a 
rational resolution to deep disagreements lies in argumentation. Other forms of 
persuasion cannot produce rational resolutions because they are fundamentally 
irrational or not yet rational.  
The second motivation to adopt an argument-only approach derives from 
its firmly-rooted anti-paternalism. The approach is anti-paternalistic in that it 
recognizes both us and others as rational beings who are responsive to reasons. 
By tying rationality to argumentation, the argument-only approach effectively 
isolates effects in belief formation and adoption that arise from argumentation, 
or ‘purely epistemic’ grounds, from the effects that arise from non-epistemic 
bases, such as coercion and force. In other words, it is only because the 
argument-only approach is deeply committed to the idea that we are rational 
beings and ought to be treated as such that it finds itself drawn to a Kantian 
conception of rationality.  
A third reason one might find the argument-only approach appealing is 
that it preserves the epistemic and normative force of reasons. That reasons 
have an intuitive epistemic and normative appeal is evident in our everyday 
practices.1 Their epistemic force derives from the crucial role that reasons play 
in justifying knowledge claims. Insofar as reasons are what give rise to 
justification, they constitute a sufficient but not necessary condition for 
knowledge. It would go against ordinary intuition to attribute knowledge to a 
merely true belief because that would entail that unjustified true beliefs, such as 
lucky guesses, would count as instances of knowledge. In referring to the 
normative force of reasons, I mean to draw out the intuitive idea that there are 
                                                        
1 Although there are those who might contest this characterization of preserving the force of 
reasons as a desiderata of the argument-only approach, my aim here is not to adjudicate 
between epistemic internalists and externalists. My suspicion is that the externalist would 
offer an interesting approach to thinking about rational resolutions to deep disagreements, 
but that the internalist line of thought appears more commonly in the literature, which is why 
I have chosen to focus on it in this paper.  
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some reasons that should persuade us to formulate and adopt our beliefs (or act) 
in certain ways, even if we have other motivating or explanatory reasons for 
believing or behaving otherwise. In short, reasons are normative in that we 
ought to find them compelling, regardless of whether we in fact do. The idea is 
that the argument-only approach’s commitment to our fundamental rationality 
also commits it to the idea that explicit reason-giving, insofar as they sit at the 
center of the argument-only model’s conception of rationality, are epistemically 
and normatively important to us. Reasons have a special hold on us, a kind of 
epistemic and normative force. 
A fourth characteristic strength of the argument-only approach is that it 
maintains a firm grip on objectivity because it is committed to the translatability 
thesis, while simultaneously allowing for a commitment to socially-informed 
understandings of knowledge. Roughly, the translatability thesis rejects the idea 
of the absolute incommensurability of conceptual schemes (Davidson 1973-74). 
Positively stated, all conceptual schemes are translatable and thereby accessible 
to reasoning. Insofar as no conceptual scheme can fundamentally resist 
translation, the propositions that make up such a scheme constitute objective 
reasons because they are theoretically epistemically and normatively accessible 
and persuasive to all rational beings in the same way. The advantage of such an 
approach is that it can both maintain objectivity and recognize the social basis of 
knowledge. For instance, the translatability thesis can accommodate the two 
theses that constitute feminist standpoint theory:  
The Situated-Knowledge Thesis: Social location systematically influences our 
identities, experiences, and epistemic capacities, thereby shaping what and how 
we know. (Wylie 2003, 62) 
The Thesis of Epistemic Advantage: Those who occupy socially marginal space 
may develop or amass epistemic advantages in at least some contexts. (Wylie 
2003, 63; Intemann 2010, 783)  
The argument-only approach would accept the idea that social locations 
may systematically influence our knowledge and that these locations may offer 
epistemic advantages to those who occupy the social margins, but it would reject 
the idea that such social locations offer unique epistemic advantages that cannot 
be propositionally shared with those who do not occupy those locations. In this 
way, the argument-only approach rejects only a strong reading of socially-
informed ways of knowing, that is, the idea that some social bases offer unique 
access in some contexts.  
The fifth reason for the argument-only approach’s appeal is that it 
contains explanatory value. As an explanation for the depth of disagreements, 
the argument-only proponent can point to a failure to effectively, genuinely, and 
accurately share or consider evidence. In short, disagreements of depth arise 
from implicit or explicit failures to argue well.  
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III. The Argument-Plus Approach 
While there are certainly good reasons to find the argument-only approach 
compelling, I want to draw our attention to three potential objections to 
understanding deep disagreements according to this model. From these 
objections, we will be in a position to formulate the argument-plus approach.  
First, insofar as it operates along a Kantian conception of rationality, the 
argument-only approach is open to the Hegelian line of criticism that such a 
conception of rationality underestimates habit and second nature as a source of 
manifest rationality. In Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel offers a harsh 
criticism of the Kantian ideal of rationality, rejecting the idea that critical 
reflection constitutes the most developed manifestation of rationality. There are 
two main reasons why Hegel takes such a disparaging stance towards critical 
reflection. First, conscience – what Hegel takes to be the embodiment of critical 
reflection – lacks a determinate conception of the good and therefore also lacks 
an objective criterion for determining the good (Hegel 2016, §141, 186). 
Consequently, it poses the risk of becoming evil at any moment. For this reason, 
Hegel rejects the idea that critical reflection is unqualifiedly good (Hegel 2016, 
§139, 167-70). Put more directly, critical reflection alone is fundamentally 
limited in its capacity to determine the good. The second danger stems from the 
fact that the process of critical reflection necessarily involves self-alienation. 
Insofar as this is the case, critical reflection always poses the structural threat of 
throwing the subject into a “bottomless pit of self-questioning.” (Honneth, 2010, 
41) This is why Hegel considers the cultivation of habit in ethical life to 
constitute an achievement. In ethical life, not only are our reasons tied to a 
determinate conception of the good but we also immediately relate to those 
reasons insofar as we feel at home in the forms of life from which those reasons 
emerge. In Hegelian terms, reason is most fully realized – or actual – in ethical 
life and the habitual disposition we develop in such forms of life (Hegel 2016, 
§27, 57; §151, 195). 
In contrast to the argument-only approach, the argument-plus approach 
takes argumentation to constitute merely one form in which our rationality 
manifests. Turner and Wright (2005) insightfully call our attention to practices 
and behaviors other than argumentation, such as learning and enculturation, 
that also manifest our rationality. My suggestion is that, by turning to the 
Hegelian notion of rationality, we can not only recognize Turner and Wright’s 
insight, but also think more critically about the valorized status of reflection and 
appreciate the achievement of second nature in ethical life. In ethical life, we not 
only feel at home in the world but we do so in a world that is rational. Our 
cultural participation in ethical life, and to the extent that it manifests as habitual 
and therefore expresses itself as a relation of immediate self-relation, constitutes 
the fullest actualization of our rationality (Lumsden 2016). In short, the 
argument-plus approach, unlike the argument-only approach, can appreciate the 
cultivation of habit and second nature in ethical life not only as an achievement 
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but also as a realization of a higher order than critical reflection and 
argumentation. 
Second, one might criticize the argument-only approach’s commitment to 
the uniqueness thesis because it operates according to a misguided conception of 
knowledge. Arguably, this mistaken conception is one of the driving factors for 
the argument-only proponent’s rejection of a strong interpretation of the social 
basis of knowledge. One might resist the idea of absolute translatability on the 
grounds that not all knowledge is reducible to propositional form. We might call 
this residual knowledge understanding.2 Although I cannot hope to offer a 
detailed account of this notion of understanding in this paper, my suspicion is 
that what is leftover and untranslated when we attempt to reduce a form of life 
into propositional content has much to do with understanding that derives from 
having particular dispositions, or more specifically an emotional and cognitive 
orientation, that plays a crucial role in our ability to recognize, assess, and 
respond appropriately to salience (de Sousa 1987, 141-204; Lance and Tanesini 
2004; Döring 2009). Recent developments within psychology and cognitive 
science bolster the idea that emotion constitutes a central component of rational 
thought, insofar as emotion enables us to be “interested in” or “attentive to” an 
object (Blanchette and Richards 2009; Koole 2009; Gyurak, Gross, and Etkin 
2011). In short, emotions constitute a precondition, not a hindrance, for the 
collection and assessment of evidence, deliberation, and argumentation. These 
dispositions, which are at least in part and substantially emotional, might 
themselves be socially molded and are necessary for comprehension of a form of 
life insofar as they comprise a central component of forms of reasoning. 
My contention is that, even in cases in which one accurately, genuinely, 
diligently, and fully transcribes a form of life into propositions and shares these 
propositions in deep disagreements, one loses the disposition that, at the very 
least, accompanies understanding in translation. Even if one could describe such 
a disposition, having propositional knowledge of said disposition – or the 
exhaustive list of experiences that gave rise to it – could not by itself produce 
understanding. I suspect that the reason for this is that, as a kind of disposition, 
understanding does not merely emerge from having access to and reflecting 
upon a set of a propositions. If my suspicions are right, absolute and complete 
translation of a form of life - including the understanding and forms of reasoning 
to which it gives rise - into a set of propositions lies beyond the range of 
possibility. And if we are willing to reject the uniqueness thesis’ underlying 
commitment to knowledge as completely reducible to propositional knowledge 
and therefore absolutely translatable, a strong version of the sociality thesis 
begins to appear more plausible.  
                                                        
2  I am indebted to Tempest Henning for sharing her deeply insightful suspicion of 
contemporary epistemology’s overemphasis on propositional knowledge with me, which 
inspired me to turn my discomfort with the argument-only approach to knowledge into a 
criticism of its focus on propositional knowledge.  
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But why think that sociality offers us unique access to knowledge or 
understanding? It recognizes that, at minimum, some aspects of rationality are 
grounded in social forms of life, a thesis that has been widely supported and 
recognized in varying ways and to varying degrees (Sellars 1997; Freud 1989; 
Merleau-Ponty 2014; Wittgenstein 1958; Marx 1978; Hegel 2016). The appeal of 
a strong socially-informed understanding of knowledge lies in the fact that it 
seems to capture why disagreements seem as deep as they do. The idea is not 
that there is one way to reason but that reasoning takes on a variety of forms 
insofar as it is indexed to particular forms of life. This is, of course, not to deny 
the possibility of translation but it recognizes that translation is always 
imperfect, insofar as it cannot make up for a lack of or develop an appropriate 
emotional attunement or disposition that emerges from the practices, behaviors, 
education, and enculturation which comprise particular forms of life. We can 
accordingly explain deep disagreements as those disagreements that arise when 
two forms of life – and their respective orientations to the world – conflict. What 
is rationally salient in one form of life may simply be rationally unpersuasive in 
another.  
The third concern regarding the argument-only approach is that it 
unsatisfactorily dissolves the very phenomena of deep disagreements. Part of 
what is compelling about the idea of deep disagreements is that people find them 
genuinely ‘deep,’ even if not absolutely so. The argument-only approach can only 
explain the difficulty of rationally resolving deep disagreements by pointing to 
explanations that indicate we are either hindered by irrational motives or have 
simply not genuinely engaged in argumentation. But neither explanation seems 
to capture the phenomena of deep disagreements in which we surely are not 
‘blinded by our emotions’ and have also tried to sincerely reason and argue with 
one’s interlocutor. I want to suggest that the argument-plus approach offers a 
more satisfying way of thinking about the kinds of deep disagreements that 
persist despite continued, genuine, and well-argued disagreements. The 
acceptance of a strong view of sociality, in a sense, makes deep disagreements 
deeper because there are now two chasms to cross: one of argumentation and 
one of a socially-grounded form of reasoning. And while this might appear 
alarming to optimists, I want to suggest that this approach more accurately 
captures the phenomenon of deep disagreements.  
IV. Hegel on Deep Disagreements 
As I have formulated it, the argument-plus approach offers three distinct 
advantages against its counterpart. It recognizes habit and second nature in 
ethical life as achievements of manifest rationality, diagnoses the uniqueness 
thesis as reductive thereby making space for stronger interpretations of socially-
informed ways of reasoning, and offers a more satisfying explanation of the 
depth of deep disagreements. In light of its strengths, we can also identify its 
corresponding weaknesses. In this section, I explore four challenges to my 
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Hegelian-inspired formulation of the argument-plus approach, but focus on what 
I take to be its most damaging criticism – that it is paternalistic. Although I do not 
offer a full defense of the argument-plus approach in this paper, my aim is to 
show that by drawing on a particular conception of human nature we can resist 
some of the objections that are generated by a Hegelian argument-plus model.  
There are two interrelated objections that emerge from the Hegelian arc 
that I have attributed to the argument-plus approach. The first objection is that it 
offers an uncritical valorization of habit. If rationality most fully realizes itself in 
second nature in ethical life, the very possibility of social critique and critical 
consciousness seems to, at least on first glance, have no place in ethical life. In 
short, Hegel’s understanding of second nature in ethical life offers what appears 
to be a deeply conservative portrayal of rationality that is antithetical to the 
critical reflection that often constitutes social critique. While this paper is not the 
place to defend my reading of Hegel, I want only to point out that Hegel himself 
acknowledges that habit, like critical reflection, is not unqualifiedly good.3 That is, 
critical reflection also constitutes an essential component of ethical life. My 
contention is that their difference lies in the fact that, for Hegel, being at home in 
the world in ethical life constitutes the highest – or most actualized – form of 
rationality, whereas Kant precariously, if not naively, treats critical reflection 
and argumentation as the culmination of rationality. Put in relation to social and 
political concerns, while it might be true that being an ‘insider-outsider’ with a 
critical consciousness might give one better epistemic access to knowledge and 
understanding, the kind of marginalization that produces a social position 
characterized by, in Hegelian terms, the systemic inability to be at home in a 
dominant or oppressive form of life for certain people often comes at a great 
material and psychological cost. Unlike Kant’s conception of rationality, Hegel 
rejects this naive valorization of critical reflection because it overlooks the 
importance of being at home in the world.  
The second objection is that, in adopting a Hegelian approach to deep 
disagreements, the argument-plus model appears to endorse paternalism, 
insofar as it defends other non-argumentative practices as capable of producing 
rational resolutions to deep disagreements. What makes the charge of 
paternalism so fatal for a model for understanding deep disagreement is that it 
makes the site of any deep disagreement an appropriate site for the use of 
alternative means of persuasion, including potentially coercion and force. The 
problem is that it seems to endorse the imposition of an external system of 
reasoning and set of reasons onto a subject who could and would not endorse 
those reasons as her own. In this paper, I entertain four varieties of the charge of 
paternalism. 
                                                        
3 Others offer excellent defenses of Hegel against this charge. See Robert M. Wallace’s (2001) 
“Hegel on ‘Ethical Life’ and Social Criticism,” Simon Lumsden’s (2012) “Habit, Sittlichkeit and 
Second Nature,” Andreja Novakovic’s (2017) Hegel on Second Nature in Ethical Life, and 
Walsh’s (2012) “Distance and Engagement: Hegel’s Account of Critical Reflection.” 
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The first formulation of the paternalism charge can be stated in the 
following way: the argument-plus approach accepts not yet rational or irrational 
means of persuasion as processes that can produce rational resolutions to deep 
disagreements. This objection proceeds on the basis of a Kantian conception of 
rationality whereby critical reflection – and its public form, argumentation – is 
held as the apotheosis of our rationality as finite rational beings. The 
consequence is that non-argumentative practices, such as education and 
enculturation, constitute latently rational means of persuasion, practices that 
enable us to realize our rational behavior but are not themselves manifestly 
rational in the same way argumentation is. My suggestion is that, by turning to 
Hegel’s recognition of the achievement of second nature in ethical life, we can 
develop a greater appreciation for the ways in which rationality manifests in 
habit.  
A second way of articulating the charge of paternalism is that, even if we 
grant the argument-plus proponent and confer the status of ‘manifestly rational’ 
onto education and enculturation, we lack a criterion and therefore a principled 
means of distinguishing between rational (in this broader Hegelian 
characterization) and irrational means of persuasion, such that the two become 
indistinguishable. The desirability of such a criterion should be apparent by now. 
Without it, it becomes unclear when education becomes a form of glorified 
brainwashing, or ‘re-education.’ Even so, this paper is not the place to attempt to 
identify criteria for distinguishing between rational and irrational means of 
persuasion. Nevertheless, we can retain the conceptual possibility that such a 
criterion or set of criteria can be articulated by pointing to a site of agreement 
among both argument-plus and argument-only supporters. Both would 
presumably accept the idea that not all varieties of education and enculturation 
are forms of ‘re-education.’ Insofar as this is the case, we can salvage the 
conceptual possibility that there is indeed a way of distinguishing between 
rational and irrational means of persuasion, even if that process or set of criteria 
cannot be articulated here.  
A third version of the paternalism charge might take on the following form: 
even if the education approach is a rational method of producing rational 
resolutions to deep disagreements, it is nevertheless a paternalistic program 
when we impose it upon individuals who already know how to argue. That is, it 
is not merely the content of the education program that determines whether it is 
paternalistic; it is also a matter of the circumstances in which that education is 
imposed. The idea is that there is a substantial difference between educating a 
child, so that she may realize her rational capacities as a knower by developing 
the skill of argumentation and educating someone who already knows how to 
argue. In the former case, one is teaching another how to reason. In the latter, 
one is ‘teaching’ someone to recognize someone else’s reasons and that 
precariously borders on paternalism.  
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An argument-plus defender may respond in one of two ways. First, ‘re’-
education might be appropriate in those instances in which someone has failed 
to develop reasoning skills that constitute a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of being enculturated. One such skill might be the capacity for self-
correction. We might even go so far as to say that without such a skill one has not 
become a proper member of any epistemic community. But, of course, such a 
standard of being a proper member of an epistemic community is easily satisfied, 
insofar as the capacity for self-correction is merely a formal procedure and 
contains no given content.  
To respond to the more substantial paternalism charge about re-education, 
I suggest that we turn to the Hegelian tradition of immanent critique. As Rahel 
Jaeggi (2009) argues, immanent critique offers a more promising method of 
adjudicating amongst conflicting forms of life than other forms of social critique 
because it avoids the shortcomings associated with both internal and external 
critique. Internal critique remains entirely dependent on the resources within a 
given lifeform, which precludes forms of more radical social critique – namely, 
ones that might put into question the very standards internal to a given form of 
life. External critique paternalistically imposes external standards and reasons 
that the object of its critique would not accept as reasons for action. In contrast 
to both internal and external critique, immanent critique offers a promising third 
alternative. Immanent critique relies on the process of determinate negation, or 
the transformation of the old into what is both new and grounded in the old 
through the processes of negation, preservation, and unification. This kind of 
social critique is ‘immanent’ in the sense that it generates new ideals through the 
overcoming of the practical contradictions engendered by the original norms in 
question. In this way, one can understand Hegelian immanent critique as a kind 
of anti-paternalistic problem-solving or learning process.  
One can formulate the paternalism charge in a fourth way: while 
immanent critique seems to offer a non-paternalistic version of producing 
rational resolutions to deep disagreements, it nevertheless requires more than a 
merely formal criterion for identifying practical contradictions or problems. 
Certainly, at an absolute minimum, a formal criterion for recognizing practical 
contradictions, such as a consistency requirement, is embedded within the 
process of immanent critique. But I want to suggest that if we are genuinely 
committed to the sociality thesis, then we are also committed to a thicker 
content-laden criterion for recognizing practical contradictions as such. The 
thought behind this should appeal to both proponents of the argument-only and 
argument-plus approach. If reasoning is indeed, at least in part, necessarily 
indexed to particular forms of life such that forms of knowing are socially 
situated, then recognizing problems is not merely a matter of deconstructing old 
ways of reasoning but also necessarily involves positively constructing new ways 
of reasoning and understanding the world. That is, there is no view from 
nowhere from which we can identify practical contradictions qua practical 
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contradictions. And, if this is the case, the new ideals generated through 
immanent critique are not generated through some empty formal problem-
solving process. One requires a standard against which all forms of life can be 
measured. And so, we have returned to an external standard and the risk of 
paternalism reappears.  
The response to this fourth variation of the paternalism objection, I 
contend, hinges on adopting a minimal but nevertheless substantial 
anthropological thesis about human nature – that is, we are embodied, socially 
constituted and dependent, and necessarily productive creatures who take our 
own lives as the objects of our creative expression. Insofar as we are the types of 
human beings that we are, there are certain ways in which all forms of life are 
continuous or can be measured against the same standard. I do not wish to spell 
out the contents of this anthropological thesis here, but my conjecture is that a 
non-reductive naturalistic approach of this sort offers us a potential way of 
defending the argument-plus approach from the charge of paternalism.  
In turning to immanent critique as a potential source of resolving deep 
disagreements, however, we have ostensibly unwittingly produced a defense of 
the argument-only approach insofar as immanent critique constitutes a form or 
component of argumentation. The basis for this objection rests in thinking about 
immanent critique according to what James Gordon Finlayson (2014, 1153) 
describes as its “slender, commonplace” version or, as I want to classify it, as a 
purely argumentative exercise. My conjecture is that the Hegelian tradition of 
immanent critique cannot be reduced to a purely pragmatic problem-solving 
process, as a practice that merely concerns the articulation of background 
premises and presuppositions and the deduction of valid inferences. This 
commonplace understanding of immanent critique draws on a similarly thin 
conception of critique grounded in a notion of knowledge as reducible to 
propositions. In contrast, the Hegelian tradition of immanent critique draws on a 
thicker notion of critique, one that is grounded in forms of reasoning and ways of 
understanding that arise from forms of life. According to this line of thought, 
immanent critique involves more than mere argumentation but also the active, 
constructive, and transformational practice of “forging links,” whereby we 
develop new ways of being in the world (Jaeggi 2009, 79). Critique, in this 
Hegelian sense, requires more than just the articulation of well-founded 
criticisms and statements; it also encapsulates the practice of coming to develop 
the forms of life and the forms of reasoning to which they give rise that one 
needs to see objects of critique as such. Thus, the invocation of a Hegelian 
understanding of critique, like that of rationality, speaks to more than those 
activities often associated with argumentation. In short, if we adopt a Hegelian 
approach to immanent critique, we can reject the idea that discussion of 
immanent critique converts the argument-plus approach into an argument-only 
approach.  
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Despite the defense of the argument-plus approach I have attempted to 
offer here, it is not lost on me that more needs to be said. Substantial criticisms 
of the argument-plus approach remain. However, my suspicion is that adopting 
such an anthropological thesis might also pave a path for the interested 
argument-plus defender to respond to additional criticisms, particularly those 
related to relativism and the deflation of the force of reasons. Regarding the 
charge of relativism, a critic of the argument-plus approach might argue that, if 
we accept the sociality thesis, it looks like we have conceded that there is no 
objective truth. Truth is now indexed to particular forms of life and this appears 
to foreclose the possibility of non-coercively resolving deep disagreements. 
However, the anthropological thesis wards off the possibility of relativism, 
insofar as it maintains that there is indeed a universal standard to which forms 
of life and the systems of reasoning to which they give rise must ultimately 
answer. 
A second challenge to the argument-plus approach is that it looks like it 
offers a deflationary account of reasons. It seems to me that the anthropological 
thesis allows a defender of the argument-plus approach to successfully avert the 
charge that she has deflated the normative force of reasons, but it is less clear 
how one might avoid the charge that one has deflated the epistemic force of 
reasons. Insofar as reasons are indexed to particular forms of life, their epistemic 
force – that is, their capacity to give rise to justification – is significantly weaker. 
The question then is: how should we understand the practice of asking and 
giving reasons, if not as a primarily justificatory practice? Following the work of 
Herbert Fingarette (2000), I suggest that we should expand our understanding of 
the very practice of reasoning. It is not just that it enables justification. It is also 
central to the acquired skill of ‘spelling things out.’ Part of why we reason is to 
make sense of our world as our own. In spelling out our world and making the 
implicit explicit, we also see ourselves as endorsing our form of life. Of course, in 
doing so, we also hold our forms of life up to our forms of reasoning and, when 
our forms of life fail to live up to this standard, they risk producing a sense of 
alienation. In short, forms of life are also answerable to our practices of 
reasoning. We might say the epistemic force of reasoning practices is, in some 
sense, expanded upon in this account. Reasoning enables us not only to justify 
knowledge, but also to endorse knowledge as our own. 
V. Conclusion 
Why adopt an argument-plus approach to deep disagreements? At first glance, 
the motivation for such an enterprise seems to be severely outweighed by the 
significant costs of trying to reconsider rationality in a Hegelian light. Indeed, I 
offer only a partial sketch of an argument-plus model of deep disagreements 
precisely because it does not eschew the difficult questions of how to hold onto 
both argumentation and second nature as manifest expressions of rationality, a 
strong interpretation of sociality and objectivity as compatible, and 
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propositional knowledge and knowledge which exceeds propositional reduction. 
Nevertheless, I contend that grappling with these questions in regards to deep 
disagreements is not only timely but also necessary. Questions about the nature 
of deep disagreements sit at the heart of the contemporary political landscape. 
Deep disagreements and the ways we will confront them, in many ways, are 
what will characterize this historical period. Turning the conversation away 
from argumentation, I want to suggest, is one way to begin to broaden the 
conversation about how to think about rationally resolving the kinds of 
entrenched and pervasive deep disagreements that characterize much of our 
political engagement today.  
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